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1. Bhart®hari’s commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya contains, in the first Óhnika, the 
following remark concerning the Såµkhya philosophy (CE I p. 23 l. 21-23, AL p. 28 l. 
11-13, Sw p. 33 l. 22-24, Ms 9c5-7): 
 
na h¥daµ ßåstraµ kasyacid ekasya sahåyabhËtaµ sarvasådhåraˆam/ 
såµkhyåd¥nåµ dravyåd eva pratipatti˙ rËpådisamavåyo gha†o ‘rthåntarabhËto 
veti yasya yo gha†as tasmin gha†aßabdaµ prayu∫kte 
For this science [of grammar] is common to all and does not side with anyone. 
For example, according to the Såµkhyas and others the understanding derived 
from a substance is that a vase is a collection of colour(s) and so on, or 
something else; [the grammarian] uses the word ‘vase’ with regard to that which 
constitutes a vase for the [person with whom he is in discussion]. 
 
What interests us in this passage is the passing reference to the Såµkhya position, 
according to which a vase is a collection of colour(s) and so on. 
 A similar statement occurs in the Våkyapad¥ya (ed. Rau, 3.13.14): 
 
sarvamËrtyåtmabhËtånåµ ßabdåd¥nåµ guˆe guˆe/ 
traya˙ sattvådidharmås te sarvatra samavasthitå˙// 
Those three characteristics, sattva etc., which are found in each quality from 
among sound etc. which constitute all corporeal objects, are present everywhere. 
 
The mention of ‘the three characteristics, sattva etc.’ — i.e., sattva, rajas, and tamas — 
leaves no doubt that the system of thought referred to is, again, Såµkhya.2 
 Bhart®hari does not stand alone in attributing to Såµkhya the position that 
material objects are collections of the qualities colour, sound, etc. Puˆyaråja’s 
commentary on the second Kåˆ∂a of the Våkyapad¥ya may refer to the same view in the 
following passage (ed. Iyer p. 63 l. 16; on VP 2.135): 
[310] 
vaiße∑ikeˆåvayavinaµ pratipådayituµ gha†aßabda˙ prayukta˙ såµkhyair 
guˆasamåhåramåtram abhimanyate jainasaugatai˙ paramåˆusaµcayamåtram iti 
... 
The Vaiße∑ika uses the word ‘vase’ to designate the whole; the Såµkhyas think 
that it is used to designate the collection of guˆas and nothing else; the Jainas 
and Buddhists, only a heap of atoms. 
                                                
1 I thank E. Franco and A. Wezler for useful suggestions. 
2 The commentator Helåråja, interestingly, tries to show that sound etc. only seem to constitute corporeal 
objects (pt. ii p. 138 l. 21-22): vyatireke ‘pi dravyasya samavåyavaßåt tadåtmakatvam iva. 
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There is some ambiguity in this statement in as far as the Såµkhyas are concerned: the 
term guˆa does not only mean quality in this system of thought, it can also refer to the 
three constituents (sattva, rajas, tamas) of primary matter. 
 No such ambiguity attaches to Dharmapåla’s introductory remarks to 
Óryadeva’s Catu˙ßataka verse 301 (tr. Tillemans, 1990: 135): "[The Såµkhya 
philosopher] Kapila asserts [the following]: Things such as vases and cloths are 
established simply as colours (rËpa)3 and other such [properties]; the natures (svabhåva; 
dravya ?), which are the objects of the sense organs, do really exist." SiµhasËri, 
similarly, ascribes to Såµkhya the view that vases etc. (gha†ådi) are collections of 
colours etc. (rËpådisamËha).4 
 All these statements — as well as others from Mallavådin’s Dvådaßåra 
Nayacakra and Kaiya†a’s commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya, to be considered below — 
support Bhart®hari’s claims according to which the Såµkhyas looked upon material 
objects as being constituted of ‘colour(s) etc.’ (rËpådi), or of ‘sound etc.’ (ßabdådi). It 
seems moreover clear that ‘colour(s) etc.’ and ‘sound etc.’ in these statements refer to 
the five qualities colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. 
 
2. It is not easy to reconcile the contents of these statements with classical 
Såµkhya doctrine as presented in the Yuktid¥pikå, the most elaborate commentary on 
Áßvarak®∑ˆa’s Såµkhya Kårikå. There, it may be recalled, the material world is 
conceived of as having evolved out of Prak®ti, through a number of intermediate stages. 
Material objects are considered to consist of the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind 
and ether. Qualities are not even mentioned among the 25 tattvas which constitute the 
world. In fact, the elements that do figure among the 25 tattvas possess qualities: ether 
possesses only sound; wind possesses sound and touch; fire possesses sound, touch and 
colour; water possesses sound, touch, colour and taste; earth, finally, possesses sound, 
touch, colour, taste and smell. These five elements are believed to have directly evolved 
out of five tanmåtras, which carry the names of the five qualities without [311] being 
qualities themselves. The distinction between tanmåtras and qualities is clear from the 
following passage (Yuktid¥pikå p. 118 l. 14-16): 
  
ßabdaguˆåc chabdatanmåtråd åkåßam ekaguˆam/ ßabdasparßaguˆåt 
sparßatanmåtråd dviguˆo våyu˙/ ßabdasparßarËpaguˆåd rËpatanmåtråt triguˆaµ 
teja˙/ ßabdasparßarËparasaguˆåd rasatanmåtråc caturguˆå åpa˙/ 
ßabdasparßarËparasagandhaguˆåd gandhatanmåtråt pañcaguˆå p®thiv¥/  
From the tanmåtra [called] ‘sound’, which has sound as quality, ether [is born,] 
which has [that] one quality. From the tanmåtra [called] ‘touch’, which has 
                                                
3 Tillemans translates "[visual] forms", which is another possible rendering of Skt. rËpa. 
4 DNC I p. 266 l. 9. For SiµhasËri’s interpretation of this statement, see section 3, below. 
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sound and touch as qualities, wind [is born,] which has [these] two qualities. 
From the tanmåtra [called] ‘colour’, which has sound, touch and colour as 
qualities, fire [is born,] which has [these] three qualities. From the tanmåtra 
[called] ‘taste’, which has sound, touch, colour and taste as qualities, water [is 
born,] which has [these] four qualities. From the tanmåtra [called] ‘smell’, which 
has sound, touch, colour, taste and smell as qualities, earth [is born,] which has 
[these] five qualities.5 
 
Interestingly, it is not certain that the Yuktid¥pikå correctly represents the position of 
the Såµkhya Kårikå in this respect. The Såµkhya Kårikå leaves us in doubt whether it 
distinguishes between the tanmåtras and the qualities ‘colour’, ‘sound’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’, 
and ‘touch’. This can be seen as follows. 
 Recall first that several early texts, such as Aßvagho∑a’s Buddhacarita (12.18-
19) and some portions of the Mahåbhårata (cr. ed. 12.203.25-29; 294.27-29; 298.10-21; 
14.49.34 f.), knew a form of Såµkhya in which the five qualities figure among the 
tattvas; they are here among the final evolutes, and derive from the five elements.6 
Here, then, the qualities do figure among the fundamental tattvas. It is true that they did 
not occupy the same position as the tanmåtras in classical Såµkhya.7 It is yet 
conceivable (though not provable, as far as I can see) that the five tanmåtras, at one 
phase of the development of Såµ-[312]khya, were the five qualities. 
 This possibility is not contradicted by the Såµkhya Kårikå. That is to say, this 
text allows, besides the ‘orthodox’ interpretation, of an interpretation in which the 
tanmåtras are the five qualities. Consider first verse 28a: 
 
rËpådi∑u (v.l. ßabdådi∑u) pañcånåm ålocanamåtram i∑yate v®tti˙ 
The function of the five [sense organs] with regard to colour (v.l. sound) etc., is 
deemed to be mere perception. 
 
Here it is possible to take "colour (or sound) etc." to be the five qualities of those 
names. Verse 34a, on the other hand, has: 
 
buddh¥ndriyåˆi te∑åµ pañca viße∑åviße∑avi∑ayåˆi 
Of the [tenfold external organ] the five sense organs have the viße∑as and the 
aviße∑as as objects. 
                                                
5 A similar passage occurs in the Må†harav®tti (on SK 22; p. 37 l. 5-9). The Gau∂apådabhå∑ya and the 
commentary translated into Chinese by Paramårtha simply derive the elements from one tanmåtra each, 
without mentioning qualities. See further note 8, below. 
6 This has been known at least since Otto Strauss (1913); see also Frauwallner, 1927. 
7 Occasionally one gets the impression that the idea of qualities as constituting the very end of the 
evolutionary list of tattvas is not completely unknown to classical Såµkhya. An example is the following 
line, quoted in the Yuktid¥pikå (p. 117 l. 13-14): upabhogasya ßabdådyupalabdhir ådi˙ 
guˆapuru∑opalabdhir anta˙. Interestingly, YD p. 64 l. 19 f. states that the qualities sound etc. are 
pervaded (anu-gam) by, or have the same nature as (-svarËpa), the three constitutents (here called sukha, 
du˙kha, and moha), as does Mallavådin’s Dvådaßåra Nayacakra I p. 265; SK 38, on the other hand, 
makes a similar observation regarding the elements (bhËta), using the terms ßånta, ghora and mË∂ha (YD 
p. 119 l. 20-21 adds that the tanmåtras are not ßånta, ghora and mË∂ha). 
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The meanings of viße∑a and aviße∑a are explained in verse 38: 
 
tanmåtråˆy aviße∑ås tebhyo bhËtåni pañca pañcabhya˙/ ete sm®tå viße∑å˙ 
The tanmåtras are the aviße∑as. From those five [arise] the five elements; these 
are known as the viße∑as. 
 
According to Såµkhya Kårikå 34a, then, the sense organs have as objects the five 
elements and the five tanmåtras.8 If it is true that five qualities are the objects (verse 
28a, as interpreted above), one might think that the five tanmåtras are the five qualities. 
Nothing in the Såµkhya Kårikå militates against this view, as far as I can see.9 
 It would be premature to draw far-reaching consequences from the lack of 
clarity of the Såµkhya Kårikå. It is not at all certain that it looked upon the tanmåtras as 
qualities. But if it did, this would not be without interest in connection with the various 
quotations maintaining that in Såµkhya material objects are collections of qualities. 
 
3.  We must now consider a passage in Mallavådin’s Dvådaßåra Nayacakra which 
criticizes the Såµkhyas. This passage reads, in the reconstruction of Muni Jambuvijaya 
(I p. 268 l. 1-2): 
[313] 
atha katham ekakåraˆatvaprati∑edhånantaraµ ßabdaikaguˆaprav®tti viyad 
abhyupagamyate/ na pravartetaivam, asandrute˙, puru∑avad vandhyåputravad 
vå/ 
But how [can the Såµkhyas] accept that ether is produced from the single 
quality sound, immediately after rejecting [the possibility] that something has 
one single cause? It cannot be produced in this way, because [ether] is not a 
collection, just as a soul (puru∑a) or the son of a barren woman [is not a 
collection]. 
 
The commentator SiµhasËri cites in connection with the term asandrute˙ "because 
[ether] is not a collection", the following phrase from the Mahåbhå∑ya: guˆasandråvo 
dravyam "a material object is a collection of qualities". We shall pay further attention to 
this phrase below. Here it is sufficient to note that SiµhasËri is most probably correct in 
                                                
8 Most of the commentaries hasten to add that the tanmåtras are not grasped by the sense-organs of 
ordinary mortals (often: asmadådi). It is here further to be noted that the Såµkhya Kårikå does not appear 
to justify the translation ‘subtle elements’ or the like for tanmåtra. Verse 39 rather speaks of a subvariety 
of the viße∑as that are sËk∑ma ‘subtle’; these sËk∑ma viße∑as ‘subtle elements’ are clearly not aviße∑as, 
i.e., tanmåtras. 
9 Frauwallner (1953: 355 f.; also 1927: 2 (141)) claims that in early Såµkhya the different tanmåtras each 
had only one quality. (Cp. YD p. 91 l. 7: ekarËpåˆi tanmåtråˆ¥ty anye/ ekottaråˆ¥ti vår∑agaˆya˙/; also p. 
118 l. 12-13; Våcaspati Mißra’s Tattvakaumud¥ on SK 22: ßabdatanmåtråd åkåßaµ ßabdaguˆam/ 
ßabdatanmåtrasahitåt sparßatanmåtråd våyu˙ ßabdasparßaguˆa˙/ ßabdasparßatanmåtrasahitåd 
rËpatanmåtråt teja˙ ßabdasparßarËpaguˆam/ ßabdasparßarËpatanmåtrasahitåd rasatanmåtråd åpa˙ 
ßabdasparßarËparasaguˆå˙/ ßabdasparßarËparasatanmåtrasahitåd gandhatanmåtråc 
chabdasparßarËparasagandhaguˆå p®thiv¥/ jåyate ity arthah/. Similar statements in the Candrikå and 
Jayama∫galå.) This position is of course but one step removed from the above tentative suggestion that 
the five qualities once occupied the place of the tanmåtras. 
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attributing to Mallavådin the belief that the Såµkhyas looked upon material objects as 
collections of qualities. 
 Albrecht Wezler (1986: 3f.) interprets the above passage in the light of the 
passage from the Yuktid¥pikå cited in section 2, above. To quote his own words (p. 5): 
"The gist of Mallavådin’s counterargument is hence that ether cannot originate in the 
manner asserted by the Såµkhyas because it does not correspond to their definition of 
dravya, i.e. because it is not a dravya or rather because its cause, the ßabdaguˆa 
ßabdatanmåtra, is not a dravya just like the soul or the son of a barren woman." 
 This interpretation is not, however, free from difficulties. First of all, the words 
ßabdaikaguˆaprav®tti viyad in the above passage translate most naturally as "ether is 
produced from the single quality sound". The alternative translation "ether is produced 
from [the ßabdatanmåtra] which has sound as its only quality" is decidedly more 
artificial. Moreover, if the latter interpretation had been intended by Mallavådin, his 
remark "immediately after rejecting [the possibility] that something may have one 
single cause" (ekakåraˆatvaprati∑edhånantaram) would be besides the point. As can be 
seen from the Yuktid¥pikå passage cited above, each of the elements, not only ether, is 
there presented as deriving from a single cause, viz., from the corresponding tanmåtra. 
 It will hardly be necessary to point out that Mallavådin’s passage allows of an 
interpretation in the light of what we have discussed in section 1, above. The material 
world is constituted of the qualities sound etc.; these qualities are accordingly the 
causes of all material objects. Ether has but one quality, sound, and therefore but one 
cause. This, however, goes against the rule that every product must have more than one 
single cause. 
 Wezler’s interpretation of Mallavådin’s passage can, in view of the above, be 
replaced by one that does more justice to its precise wording. Interestingly, Wezler’s 
interpretation appears to coincide with the one offered by Mallavådin’s commentator 
SiµhasËri. This can be deduced from some phrases in the latter’s Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥. 
[314] 
 Consider first the following line (I p. 268 l. 4-6): yady 
anekåtmakaikakåraˆatvam i∑yate evam ekakåraˆatvaprati∑edhånantaraµ ... kathaµ 
ßabdaikaguˆaprav®tti viyad abhyupagamyate. The difficulty connected with 
ekakåraˆatvaprati∑edhånantaraµ, pointed out above, is here avoided by superimposing 
a different interpretation on this term. The "rejection of [the possibility] that something 
may have a single cause" becomes here the requirement (i∑) that something have a 
single cause which has a multiple nature. This requirement fits, of course, the different 
tanmåtras that are single causes of the corresponding elements, but have several 
qualities. 
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 SiµhasËri is equally careful to avoid the difficulty presented by the word 
ßabdaikaguˆaprav®tti. He cites an unfindable Dhåtupå†ha10 in order to interpret the 
problematic word guˆa as ‘number’. The aim of this procedure seems, once again, to 
force the orthodox version of Såµkhya upon a recalcitrant text. 
 It appears, then, possible that SiµhasËri, unlike Mallavådin, is acquainted with a 
form of Såµkhya in which tanmåtras, and not qualities (guˆa), figure in the list of 
evolutes; or perhaps: in which tanmåtras and guˆas had come to be differentiated. Be it 
noted that another passage of his Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥ (II p. 470 l. 13) enumerates 
mahat, ahaµkåra and the tanmåtras, three evolutes which succeed each other in classical 
Såµkhya. 
 If our interpretations of Mallavådin and SiµhasËri are correct, we have stumbled 
upon an interesting difference between these two authors. Mallavådin, it appears, was 
not yet acquainted with Såµkhya in its ‘classical’ form. SiµhasËri, on the other hand, 
was no longer aware of the earlier form of Såµkhya known to Mallavådin, and felt 
obliged to reinterpret the latter’s words so as to arrive at an understanding that was in 
agreement with the form of Såµkhya that he knew. 
 
4. The conclusion we have to draw from the preceding sections is that a number of 
classical authors appear to have known the Såµkhya system of thought in a form which 
was in at least some points different from the classical system as it has been handed 
down to us. The Såµkhya known to Bhart®hari, Mallavådin and others had, we have 
been led to believe, the qualities sound, colour, taste, touch and smell among its 
evolutes. Interestingly, this position is primarily known to us through texts that were no 
school-texts of the Såµkhyas, most notably a number of passages in the Mahåbhårata. 
We have seen, however, that the Såµkhya Kårikå itself may have held a similar 
position. 
[315] 
 It seems probable that Bhart®hari and the other authors we have discussed found 
the position they attributed to the Såµkhyas in one or more texts belonging to that 
school. And there can hardly be any doubt that that text — or one of those texts — is 
the one called vår∑agaˆa tantra by SiµhasËri, and which Frauwallner (1958: 13 (233)) 
identifies as the ›a∑†itantra of V®∑agaˆa.11 This text was known to Dignåga and 
Mallavådin, as Frauwallner has shown. If indeed Bhart®hari was acquainted with it, its 
date of composition must precede him, too. 
                                                
10 See editor’s note 3 to p. 268 of Mallavådin’s Dvådaßåra Nayacakra, and Wezler, 1986: 27 n. 14. 
11 Or rather Vår∑agaˆya; see Larson in Larson and Bhattacharya, 1987: 624 n. 21; Wezler, 1985: 14 n. 6; 
Chakravari, 1951: 137-38. 
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 How is it possible that SiµhasËri who, like Mallavådin, knew the ›a∑†itantra, 
gives evidence of being acquainted with a different version of Såµkhya? Frauwallner’s 
article "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Såµkhya-Systems" (1958) may provide the 
elements for an answer. Already Dignåga’s commentator Jinendrabuddhi, Frauwallner 
argues (p. 28 (248), 32 (252)), knew at least two, possibly three commentaries on the 
›a∑†itantra. It is not impossible that one of these commentators was, or was close to, the 
author of the Yoga Bhå∑ya (p. 33-34 (253-54)). 
 It is not our task at present to take position with regard to Frauwallner’s 
conclusions, which contain inevitably a speculative element. Be it however noted that 
SiµhasËri’s deviation from Mallavådin in the interpretation of Såµkhya doctrine fits in 
very well with the assumption that Såµkhya philosophy evolved, and therefore 
changed, through the reinterpretation(s) by its commentators of its classical text, which 
may have been called ›a∑†itantra. This assumption would, of course, agree very well 
with the hypothesis presented in section 2, above, according to which the Såµkhya 
Kårikå would still precede the modification which finds expression in its commentaries. 
 
5. The above reflections suggest that a major change took place in Såµkhya 
doctrine, perhaps some time in the 5th century of our era. What could possibly have 
been the reason of this change? Why should Såµkhya abandon the idea that material 
objects are nothing but collections of qualities? 
 These questions do not, at present, allow of a certain and indubitable answer. 
There are simply no texts from the period that might provide such an answer. It is yet 
very tempting to suspect a connection with the satkåryavåda, the doctrine according to 
which effects (or products) pre-exist in their causes. This doctrine of classical Såµkhya 
[316] is already known to Óryadeva12 and Mallavådin (DNC I p. 271).13 It must 
therefore have co-existed with the view that material objects are nothing but collections 
of qualities for at least some time. Yet the two are strange bedfellows. In order to 
accommodate the doctrine of satkåryavåda, classical Såµkhya views the world as an 
continuous series of modifications (pariˆåma) of substrates which do not lose their 
essence. (The ultimate substrate is, of course, known by the name prak®ti or pradhåna.) 
The Yuktid¥pikå defines pariˆåma in the following verse:14 "When the substrate 
(dharmin), without abandoning its essence, drops the earlier property (dharma) and 
accepts the next one, that is called modification (pariˆåma)." Essential in this definition 
                                                
12 E.g., Catu˙ßataka ch. 11 (Lang, 1986: esp. p. 106 f.). See further Honda, 1974. 
13 Several authors (Franco, 1991: 127; Larson, 1979: 165; Johnston, 1937: 25; Liebenthal, 1933: 9 n. 11) 
have drawn attention to the fact that satkåryavåda is without clear precedents in the earlier literature, and 
must be a relatively late development in Såµkhya. Regarding the origin of this doctrine we may recall 
Liebenthal’s (1933: 4) question: "[Wir] dürfen ... fragen, ob nicht vielleicht satkårya ... nur ein Aspekt 
einer Diskussion mit Mådhyamika-Buddhisten ist". 
14 YD p. 75 l. 6-7: jahad dharmåntaraµ pËrvam upådatte yadå param/ tattvåd apracyuto dharm¥ 
pariˆåma˙ sa ucyate//. 
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is that the substrate remains in each modification, without abandoning its essence. That 
is to say, material objects are more than mere collections of properties, there is 
necessarily something more to them, viz., the all-important substrate.15 
[317] 
 The Yoga Bhå∑ya offers a similar definition of pariˆåma:16 "The production of a 
new property in a substance which remains the same, while the earlier property is 
destroyed." It is true that the Yuktid¥pikå finds fault with this definition, but its criticism 
concerns the use of the terms ‘production’ and ‘destruction’,17 certainly not the part 
which states that the substance remains the same. 
 Is it conceivable that Såµkhya changed its view about the nature of material 
objects under pressure from the satkåryavåda? 
 
6. To conclude this article we have to consider two statements that occur in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. This text, whose author is called Patañjali, is one of the very few texts of 
early India that can rather precisely be dated: the Mahåbhå∑ya belongs almost certainly 
to the middle of the second century B.C.E. The first statement that interests us is the 
following (on P. 5.1.119 vt. 5; Mbh (ed. Kielhorn) II p. 366 l. 26): 
 
 guˆasaµdråvo dravyam 
 
The second one reads (on P. 4.1.3 vt. 7; Mbh (ed. Kielhorn) II p. 200 l. 13-14): 
                                                
15 This is how we must read Yuktid¥pikå p. 51 l. 17-18: asmåkan tu kåraˆamåtrasyaiva saµghåtåd 
åkåråntaraparigrahåd vå kriyåguˆånåµ pracitir vyaktiviße∑o bhavat¥ti bruvatåm ado∑a˙. "But [this] 
reproach is not valid for us because what we teach is that a particular manifest thing originates as the 
accumulation of movements and qualities on account of the cause and nothing but the cause having 
coagulated or having assumed another shape." (tr. Wezler, 1986: 22). This passage occurs in a discussion 
about the question whether the effect pre-exists in its cause, the famous satkåryavåda. The opponent 
argues that if the effect were there, it should be observable, which it isn’t. And if it is not observable, one 
should be able to infer it on the basis of its movements and qualities, which, again, is not the case. Here 
the author of the Yuktid¥pikå responds that one can only search for the movements and qualities of an 
effect as distinct from those of the cause, if one assumes that cause and effect themselves are distinct, 
which the Såµkhya denies. Here the Yuktid¥pikå observes (p. 51 l. 15-17): kåryakåraˆap®thaktvavådinas 
tatkriyåguˆånåµ p®thaktvam anumåtuµ yuktam ity atas tantvavasthåne pa†akriyåguˆagrahaˆåd 
anumånåbhåva ity ayam upålambha˙ såvakåßa˙ syåt. "For him who holds that effect and cause are 
separate, it is appropriate to infer that their movements and qualities are separate. For this reason the 
reproach can be made that, in the state of a [mere] thread (and no cloth), no [cloth can] be inferred on the 
basis of the observation of the movements and qualities of [that] cloth (precisely because these latter are 
not observed)." (Or, reading with Wezler (1986: 21) pa†akriyåguˆågrahaˆåd, "no [cloth can] be inferred 
because no movements and qualities of [that] cloth are observed".) Our phrase follows immediately after 
this remark. 
 It will be clear that there is no question anywhere in this discussion of objects being nothing but 
accumulations of movements and qualities. Movements and qualities come in because they distinguish 
the effect from its cause, not because they constitute either or both of the two. Essentially effect and cause 
are not distinct, precisely because they are not made up of movements and qualities. Note, to conclude, 
that the Yuktid¥pikå cites a verse which describes bodies, as well as vases etc., as nothing but collections 
of sattva etc. (p. 133 l. 1-2): tasmåt saµghåtamåtratvåt sattvåd¥nåµ gha†ådivat/ å brahmaˆa˙ parijñåya 
dehånåm anavasthitim//. 
16 YBh 3.13: avasthitasya dravyasya pËrvadharmaniv®ttau dharmåntarotpatti˙. 
17 See Halbfass, 1992: 200-201 n. 72. 
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 guˆasamudåyo dravyam 
 
Both phrases are practically synonymous, and state that material objects are collections 
of qualities. There is no reason to believe that they express the opinion of the author of 
the Mahåbhå∑ya, yet they prove that this view existed in his days. The Mahåbhå∑ya 
specifies what is meant by guˆas two pages before one of these two phrases; the guˆas 
are sound (ßabda), touch (sparßa), colour (rËpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha) (Mbh 
(ed. Kielhorn) II p. 198 l. 5). There is no reason to think that the guˆas that constitute 
material objects are different from these five. 
 Can we conclude from these two phrases that some form of Såµkhya was 
known to the author of the Mahåbhå∑ya? This would not be without danger, the more so 
since the Mahåbhå∑ya contains, to my knowledge, no clear indications to that effect. 
What is more, the view of matter as a collection of qualities was not the exclusive 
property of [318] the Såµkhyas: the Sarvåstivådins held similar views, as has been 
correctly pointed out by Wezler (1986: 32 n. 82). And whereas the Mahåbhå∑ya 
contains no clear indication that its author knew the Såµkhya doctrine, there is reason 
to believe that he was acquainted with the teachings of the early Sarvåstivådins 
(Bronkhorst, 1987: 56 ff.). This is not, however, the place to discuss this question in 
further detail. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A solution to our problem of early Såµkhya has been suggested by Någeßa Bha††a, 
author of the Uddyota, a subcommentary on the (Vyåkaraˆa-)Mahåbhå∑ya. It occurs in 
his comments on Kaiya†a’s Prad¥pa on the Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 4.1.3. Kaiya†a states (vol. 
III p. 447): 
 
sattvarajastamåµsi guˆå˙, tatpariˆåmarËpåß ca tadåtmakå eva ßabdådaya˙ pañca 
guˆå˙/ tatsa∫ghåtarËpaµ ca gha†ådi, na tu tadvyatiriktam avayavidravyam ast¥ti 
såµkhyånåµ siddhånta˙/ 
The doctrine of the Såµkhyas is [as follows:] The guˆas are sattva, rajas and 
tamas; the [so-called] five guˆas, [viz.] sound etc., are modifications of those 
[three guˆas] and [therefore] identical with these. And vases etc. are collections 
of those [five guˆas], not material wholes different from those [five guˆas]. 
 
This statement repeats the position also expressed by Bhart®hari and the other authors 
studied above. Någeßa comments as follows on the word såµkhyånåm (vol. III, p. 447): 
 
THE QUALITIES OF SÓ»KHYA  10 
 
 
såµkhyånåm iti/ seßvarasåµkhyånåm åcåryasya patañjaler ity artha˙/ 
guˆasamËho dravyam iti patañjali˙ iti yogabhå∑ye spa∑†am/ 
‘Of the Såµkhyas’ means: of Patañjali, a teacher belonging to the Såµkhyas 
with God (seßvara såµkhya). It is clear in the Yoga Bhå∑ya that according to 
Patañjali a material object is a collection of guˆas. 
 
The reference is to the Yoga Bhå∑ya on YS 3.44, which reads: 
 
ayutasiddhåvayavabhedånugata˙ samËho dravyam iti patañjali˙. 
According to Patañjali,18 a material object is an aggregate of different 
component parts which do not exist separately. 
 
Någeßa interprets this to mean, that a material object is a collection of guˆas. Is this 
correct? And what does he mean by ‘guˆa’? 
 The statement from the Yoga Bhå∑ya must be read in context. It is preceded by a 
discussion, the most important points of which (for our present purposes) are: [319] A 
material object is a collection of såmånya(s) and viße∑a(s) (såmånyaviße∑asamudåyo ‘tra 
dravyam). What are såmånyas and viße∑as? The viße∑as are sound etc. — belonging to 
earth etc. — together with their properties, shape etc. (pårthivådyå˙ ßabdådayo viße∑å˙ 
sahåkårådibhir dharmai˙). The såmånyas are corporeality (which is earth), viscosity 
(which is water), heat (which is fire), moving forward (wind),19 going everywhere 
(which is ether) (svasåmånyaµ mËrtir bhËmi˙ sneho jalaµ vahnir u∑ˆatå våyu˙ 
praˆåm¥ sarvatogatir åkåßa˙).20 The text adds that sound etc. are the viße∑as of a 
såmånya. 
 There can be little doubt that both såmånyas and viße∑as are qualities of some 
sort;21 we may speak, with Dasgupta (1924: 168), of generic and specific qualities. 
Material objects are, therefore, aggregates or collections of qualities, which are, 
moreover, inseparable. We may assume that we have to do here with a development of 
the pre-classical form of Såµkhya outlined above.22 
 Does this mean that we have to believe, following the lead of Någeßa, that 
Bhart®hari and the other authors cited at the beginning of this article referred to the 
Yoga Bhå∑ya, or perhaps to a work by the mysterious Patañjali mentioned there? It 
                                                
18 According to Halbfass (1992: 106 n. 8), the reference is to the grammarian Patañjali. This seems 
doubtful, and is indeed not the opinion of Någeßa, as we have seen. 
19 Frauwallner (1953: 357, 404) translates praˆåmitå: Vorwärtsbewegung. 
20 The Yoga Bhå∑ya on YS 4.14 enumerates the same såmånyas as: mËrti, sneha, au∑ˆya, praˆåmitva, 
avakåßadåna. 
21 Some of the såmånyas of the Yoga Bhå∑ya figure among the dharmas of the elements enumerated at 
YD p. 118 l. 21 f. 
22 Buddhist influence cannot be ruled out either. Cf. Abhidharmakoßa Bhå∑ya 1.12 (p. 8 l. 21-22): khara˙ 
p®thiv¥dhåtu˙/ sneho ‘bdhåtu˙/ u∑ˆatå tejodhåtu˙/ ¥raˆå våyudhåtu˙/; the similarity with the Yoga Bhå∑ya 
is undeniable. 
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seems doubtful. The såmånyas in the Yoga Bhå∑ya are never referred to as guˆas;23 yet 
Bhart®hari uses this term in connection with ‘sound etc.’  
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